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The United States has been fighting a War on Drugs since 1971. Although the 
goal is to reduce the amount of drugs in the United States, the policies against drugs 
extend to other countries where many of the drugs are produced. Colombia is a prime 
example of that, the recipient of United States aid for decades, yet the goals of less 
cocaine entering the United States from Colombia, a decrease in coca production, and 
fewer cocaine users have not been achieved. Instead, there have been environmental, 
economic, and civilian consequences that have seriously hurt Colombia as a country. 
New policies are needed that target more than just coca production and cocaine 
trafficking. There should be efforts to incentivize people to avoid coca production, to 
increase the government's ability to act strongly, to create peace with guerrillas, and to 
help all drug abusers and users. Hopefully the combination of all of the mentioned 
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In 1971, President Nixon declared a War on Drugs, declaring drugs to be 
America’s number one enemy, and Americans have been fighting that war ever since, 
both within and outside of their borders. This War has many obvious, well known side 
effects such as violence between drug cartels, an increasing prison population, billions 
of dollars spent, and many, many deaths. Its policies have been oriented towards 
demolishing the supply of drugs through efforts such as interdiction, cartel busting, 
eradication and more in the hopes that removing the supply of drugs will result in no 
drug users due to the lack of drugs. Unfortunately, the well-known side effects are not 
the only side effects, and the supply-side policies have not had the desired effect on the 
current international situation regarding drugs.  
American policies are not limited to affecting events only within American 
borders, and Columbia has been and continues to be the target of many American drug 
policies, most likely due to its status as the world’s leading producer of cocaine 
(Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature's Addictive Plants), but these policies are not having 
the desired effects. For example, the number of hectares in Colombia used for coca 
production has only grown during the period of supply-side policies even going so far 
as to encroach on the Amazon Forest in order to counter the fields destroyed by aerial 
fumigation (Massey, 282; Guizado, 160). The kilos of cocaine entering the United 
States cannot be accurately measured, but even with increases in seizures through 
interdiction, the Office of National Drug Control Policy predicts that the availability of 
cocaine is increasing which means that plenty is still crossing the border (Robinson, 





as the percentage of Americans using cocaine has hardly fluctuated since the start of the 
War in 1971 (Robinson, 210). In addition to the failure of reaching certain goals, there 
is also the increase in violence in Colombia due to the militarization of drug prohibition 
and the fighting between cartels and the state, a negative effect on the environment, and 
a large negative impact on the Colombian economy, side effects that only add to the 
weight of the issues regarding the current policies.  
Although these policies are flawed and problematic, the time in which they were 
originally written must be taken into consideration. These policies were created and 
later extended during times in which a hard stance policy was seen as the best way to 
fix a problem, hence the strong prohibition stance with little to no consideration of 
demand-side policies such as expansion of treatment, decriminalization of drug use, or 
talk of drug addiction being a mental health issue. For example, although Reagan 
recognized the need for demand-side policies, he talked about “getting tough on drugs” 
and had a “zero tolerance policy” in which the focus was punitive measures against 
drug users, blaming them for their decisions and thus punishing them, not helping them 
(The United States War on Drugs). However, in the current time period, it has become 
clear that supply-side only policies are not going to end the War on Drugs, and therefore 
something new must be attempted in order to end the extreme violence and impact the 
drug production and consumption of the world. There has been an increase in policy 
flexibility in the United States as certain states legalize the use of marijuana, as well as 
in Latin America where marijuana is legal in all of Uruguay, and Colombia refuses to 
continue aerial spraying of coca plants (State Marijuana Laws Map; McKay; Neuman). 





production and consumption thus opening up the conversation to a variety of new 
policy considerations.  
To further highlight and support the need for a new package of policies to fight 
the War on Drugs, this paper will analyze the outcomes of American policies against 
cocaine in Colombia. The many outcomes of the policies will serve to prove the failures 
and shortcomings of the prohibition policies that have turned Colombia into a country 
riddled with violence, environmental issues, death, and an ever increasing amount of 
drugs. To counter the current policies and issues, a new set of policies will be presented, 
oriented towards the goals of reducing cocaine production in Colombia, reducing 
cocaine use in the United States, and beginning to repair the damage caused by previous 
policies. This will ultimately prove that the supply-side oriented policies alone 
championed by the United States are not effective in terms of reaching the stated goals 
of reducing coca and cocaine production, have produced an incredibly dangerous and 
hostile situation in Colombia, and thus that there is a need for a change in policy 
orientation that moves to include more demand-side oriented policies, ones that will be 





A History of the American Drug War in Colombia 
The American War on Drugs began in the United States, but its policies have 
extended to many Latin American countries where drugs are produced and trafficked. 
One early focus was the Andean region of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia where the vast 
majority of the world’s coca was grown and cocaine was produced (Cannabis, Coca, & 
Poppy: Nature's Addictive Plants). Colombia was mainly a production country, turning 
coca leaves into cocaine, but early American policies along with the cooperation of the 
foreign governments resulted in many farmers being pushed out of Bolivia and Peru, 
relocating the growing of coca to Colombia, making Colombia the most important 
country in regards to cocaine production (Hidalgo). Following this change in country 
and then many years of increasing levels of coca cultivation, there was a new focus for 
American policy, a change that resulted in the policy known as Plan Colombia which 
was designed to help reduce both coca and cocaine production while targeting the 
revolutionaries in the country as well, such as the FARC, who use the drug trade to fund 
portions of their operations (LeoGrande, 1). Although there were several provisions 
within the Plan that focused on social and economic issues within Colombia to help 
counter the drug issues, the vast majority of the money went towards the police and the 
military in prohibition, supply-side oriented policies including interdiction and 
eradication (New: Plan Colombia; LeoGrande, 1).  
Arming the military to a greater extent is one overwhelming factor of the 
policies of both Plan Colombia and earlier aid packages to Colombia. The focus was to 
strengthen its capabilities in order to carry out interdiction and eradication as well as 





(Crandall, 60). This has been successful, to an extent, as seen with the eventual death of 
Pablo Escobar and the fall of his cartel, but it also struggles with its own issues like 
worrisome cooperation between the government and the Cali cartel during the manhunt 
(Bowden, 269). Corruption results in leaders having more than one agenda, sometimes 
working for the cartels they are fighting, sometimes funding, training, and/or supporting 
a paramilitary organization that fights the FARC without following the rules that 
militaries must follow. For example, General Santoyo has been accused of helping both 
drug gangs and paramilitary organizations while serving as the president’s head of 
security, leading to a conflict of interests (Colombia Gen Santoyo Turns Himself in over 
Drug Charges). One result of that is the increase in human rights violations in 
Colombia.  
Interdiction focuses on attempting to seize shipments of drugs before they can 
cross the border into the United States whether at the border or before. As the number 
of kilos seized increases, many people see this as a positive outcome of interdiction. 
Unfortunately, more seizures might be more indicative of increased production more so 
than decreased availability for users (Robinson, 215-216). This stems for the fact that 
for every way that the DEA and other agencies come up with to target and take the 
drugs, cartels come up with at least one new way to move their drugs, creating a never-
ending arms race between the two sides. Cartels have even gone so far as to buy or 
make mini submarines to move their drugs into the United States (Williams).  
Eradication focuses on destroying the coca crop so that there will be no coca to 
turn into cocaine. One way eradication happens is by hand, men using machetes to chop 





aerial spraying of glyphosate, a chemical found in Roundup, to kill the plant, but this 
policy has its own drawbacks (Massey, 281). For one, the spraying can only occur in 
certain areas of the country. Many of the coca fields are located in areas controlled by 
guerrilla organizations with the firepower to bring down the planes spraying the crops. 
Thus helicopters are used to protect the planes, but they have a much shorter range 
away from airports than the planes, thus limiting the reach of the chemical spray 
(Reyes, 73). Another issue is the delivery method itself. No matter how accurate and 
precise the calculations are of where to spray the chemical, wind and other factors can, 
and do, interfere with the spray, pushing the chemical to land on legal crops and natural 
flora, as well as humans and animals (Massey, 282).  
Funding the military and focusing on interdiction and eradication is supposed to 
have several results, and the United States wants those results to be a reduction of the 
flow of cocaine to the United States, a lowered purity of cocaine, and an increase of the 
price of cocaine on the streets. All of this would make it harder for users to gain access 
to cocaine and their high which should lower the percentage of cocaine users, the 
ultimate goal of these policies. However, the United States has not seen these desired 
results, and the results of that should be people arguing for a change in policies since 
the War on Drugs is not meeting its goals. This has not occurred though, in part due to 
the use of statistics to present the War on Drugs in a more positive view than reality.  
The Office of National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP for short, has been 
reporting for years that we are winning the War on Drugs, which provides support for 
the continuation of previous/current policies and the War. In fact, the current 





that can be presented to people, when displayed in the proper manner. For example, 
thousands and thousands of kilos of cocaine have been seized by border patrol agents 
and others year after year. The United States Customs and Border Protection reports on 
its website that 61,663 kilos of cocaine have been seized in 2015 alone (cbp.org, 
conversion done through Google). Statistics such as these provide support for the 
argument that the policies are having the desired effect on the cocaine trade and 
industry.  
Another positive outcome of the policies has been the destruction of large cartels 
and the imprisonment of large drug traffickers. This has been a somewhat successful 
endeavor since 1991 with the surrender of Pablo Escobar due to lots of pressure from 
the government on his business in spite of early struggles (Bowden, 98). Although he 
managed to escape prison, Colombian officials managed to track him down, with 
American help, and kill him, ending his reign of terror in Colombia and beginning the 
destruction of his cartel (Bowden, 249). In the United States, Rick Ross, the man 
blamed for the crack cocaine epidemic in America, was arrested while trying to sell 
drugs to an undercover cop (Silverstein). In other words, American officials have had 
several victories against drug cartels which supports the idea that the current policies 
should continue because, apparently, they are working.  
Aerial eradication provides another set of statistics that back up the War on 
Drugs and its current policies. Year after year, more and more hectares of coca fields 
were sprayed by Colombians in order to hinder and prevent coca production (Reyes, 
72). Again, the numbers that various government officials can provide would support 





statistics are not representative of sufficient aspects to categorize the policies as 
successful or not.  
On the contrary, the situation is not as positive as the ONDCP likes to portray it. 
While interdiction policies have worked to prevent thousands of kilos of cocaine from 
entering the United States, thousands more still enter the States. Part of this is due to the 
arms race between new ideas for cocaine transportation and the detection of said ideas, 
a race in which the cartels often have the advantage (Cocaine Smuggling in 2010). The 
cartels know that interdiction occurs and is unavoidable, and therefore there is a 
reasonable possibility that they factor the losses into their accounting, increasing their 
production goals and rendering interdiction much less effective (Rouse, 549). This 
enables Americans to have high seizure numbers while maintaining a large flow of 
cocaine into the United States. Along this line, the maintained flow of cocaine into the 
United States allows the cartels to maintain a relatively steady purity level of cocaine, 
not needing to dilute it to reach all of the markets. Price has not been affected greatly by 
the prohibition policies either because although there were early drops in prices, the 
price in 2011 had roughly recovered to pre Plan Colombia levels (Robinson, 226).  
Cartel busting does not always have the desired outcomes either. Once Escobar 
had lost control of his portion of the cocaine trade, there were other cartels that moved 
in to control what Escobar once controlled. The larger cartels often break into smaller 
cartels based on the nodes they formed within the original cartel structure which are 
often harder to target than larger ones especially when authorities do not know how 
many new cartels have emerged (Kenney, 190-191). Busting cartels can also cause 





One outcome that none of these policies attempt to factor in is known as the 
Balloon Effect, when policies appear effective in one particular area simply because the 
problem moved to another location. When the War on Drugs began, the majority of 
coca was grown outside of Colombia, but the fields migrated to Colombia when 
pressure mounted against the cartels in other countries (Rouse, 547). This effect can 
also be seen within Colombia with the outcomes of aerial eradication. As coca growers 
need more fields to grow their crop, they expand out into regions further from airports 
and with a smaller federal government presence (Guizado, 159). They have gone so far 
as to expand into the Amazon, deforesting more and more hectares as aerial eradication 
continues, using more hectares than are being sprayed, thus creating the possibility of 
even greater coca harvests. This environmental impact is an unforeseen outcome of the 
policies that must be taken into consideration when deciding if the policies have been 
successful or not.  
Another major shortcoming of the current policies is the lack of demand-side 
policies. Economics talk about supply and demand, how each one affects the other, and 
thus policies to fight the War on Drugs should consider both supply and demand. There 
are demand-side policies in terms of punishments for drug dealers and drug 
users/abusers, but there is very little focus on treatment for drug addiction. From 
Nixon’s focus on interdiction in Mexico, although he did initiate the largest treatment 
focus the United States has had, to Regan and then Clinton, the vast majority of policies 
has focused on supply-side policies, ignoring the need for treatment (The United States 
War on Drugs). Imprisoning a drug user does not help him overcome his addiction 





in prisons. Treatment has traditionally been underfunded resulting in not enough 
services for all of the drug users in the United States (Robinson, 249). Supply-side 
policies are created under the idea that with no more drugs, there will be no more users 
because there will be no product. However, if there are no more drug users, drug cartels 
will go out of business as they run out of income. Each set of policies supports the 
endeavors of the other, and thus one set of policies should no longer be overlooked in 





The Results of the Policies  
In terms of American policies to combat the War on Drugs internationally, very 
little has changed in the United States. There are still drugs entering the country at 
roughly the same price and same purity being used by roughly the same number of 
people. Plan Colombia has not had the desired effect on the United States, not much of 
an effect at all, but the situation in Colombia is vastly different. Although the desired 
outcomes, a major reduction in coca crops, cocaine production, and cartel power, have 
not been reached, there have been major effects on Colombia. 
One major impact of the policies has been on nature and the environment due to 
two different results of aerial eradication. The first issue stems from the chemical that is 
sprayed. Glyphosate is not specific to coca, killing it and leaving all other plants 
untouched, and thus any plant that it lands on will die. As stated before, aerial 
eradication is not the most accurate method of eradication, and thus many natural plants 
are killed in the process as well. The destruction of natural flora changes the ecosystem 
and creates changes in how both plants and animals interact, altering the system and 
having various effects on the humans living in the area as well. Additionally, the loss of 
coca fields forces the farmers and cartels to locate new land to use as fields if they want 
to maintain their current levels of coca production. Since the majority of presently 
cleared land is occupied, farmers have been pushing into the Amazon, cutting down 
four hectares of forest for every one hectare of fields lost to aerial eradication. Not only 
does the loss of the Amazon result in other plants and many animals losing their 
habitats, the loss of trees contributes to increased levels of carbon dioxide in the 





while aerial eradication was designed to hinder the coca growers and cocaine 
traffickers, nature and the environment are the ones feeling the greater impact while the 
coca producers just expand their fields, gaining control over more and more land.  
The policies have also had a large negative impact on Colombian citizens. Over 
the past decades, human rights abuses have been rampant in Colombia, even before 
Clinton’s Plan Colombia. Even with that knowledge, Clinton and Congress waived the 
American policy of requiring the governments of aid receiving countries to meet a 
certain standard of respect for human rights in order to pass Plan Colombia (Massey, 
280). The idea was to enable the military to hunt down and destroy the various parts of 
the drug trade used by guerrillas and other drug traffickers. The guerrillas arose after the 
1948-1958 conflict known as la Violencia when they were not given a position within 
the new power structure in Colombia. Their main conflicts with the government stem 
from the privatization of natural resources and the desire to represent the rural poor. 
Although there have been peace negotiations before, the conflict continues, and the 
FARC uses cocaine trafficking to fund a lot of their operations, supposedly accounting 
for sixty percent of the cocaine exports entering the United States (Renwick). 
Unfortunately, the militarization of the War on Drugs has mostly just increased human 
rights violations as these three types of organizations commit said violations: the 
military, paramilitary organizations, and guerilla organizations.  
The military is known for disappearances of citizens in efforts to gain 
information on drug traffickers. There is also little protection for citizens as the military 
passes through, leading to murder and rape (De La Asuncion, 449). Paramilitary 





their actions are more extreme while fighting against the FARC and other guerilla 
organizations. Ironically, even as they try to reduce cocaine trafficking and prevent the 
FARC from getting funds from cocaine, many paramilitary organizations themselves 
get additional funding from drug trafficking (LeoGrande, 5). Guerrillas are constantly 
fighting against the paramilitary organizations, and civilians get caught up between the 
two groups. If a group is in need of funds, civilians could be forced to turn their farms 
into coca farms, growing the coca for whoever took over their land. The paramilitaries 
and guerrillas also often have to decide if the people in a village are “supporting the 
enemy” or not which can lead to village-wide massacres if it’s decided that the village 
doesn’t support the “proper” group (Dion, 407; Delacour, 66).  
Therefore, the increased focus on using militarization to fight the War on Drugs 
gave more money to the military which then resulted in the general outcome of wars: 
many deaths. However, the majority of them are civilians, not people involved willingly 
in the drug trade. They are often just innocent bystanders who have land that other 
organizations want or who are accused of affiliations they do not have. Thus although 
aid money given to the Colombian military was designed to weaken the guerillas and 
other drug traffickers, it has strengthened some, in terms of the paramilitary 
organizations, and grievously hurt the Colombian people while maintaining a dangerous 
environment for them to live in.  
Loss of life is not the only result of being caught between the various groups 
fighting in Colombia for civilians. For many, there is the issue of internal displacement, 
being forced from their home and farms to move around the country in hopes of finding 





Asuncion, 440). This has created a large refugee crisis within the country, one which 
the United States has not done much to help with due to its legal definition of a refugee 
(De La Asuncion, 452). The loss of home and farm removes a citizen’s ability to be a 
productive citizen in terms of contributing to the economy and democracy but also in 
terms of being able to survive. Large internal displacement, while not mass murder, is 
another example of human rights violations, violating the economic/social right to 
adequate housing as well as various civil/political rights such as the right to safety and 
the right to participate in politics. People constantly moving around looking for food, 
shelter, and safety do not have the time to vote or file a complaint and see justice 
served.  
There are more than just environmental issues aerial eradication. Not only does 
the spray miss the coca plants, landing on legal crops families depend on to survive, it 
can land on farm animals as well as people, and it can harm them even though 
glyphosate is designed to destroy plants. The loss of farm animals can be as devastating 
as the loss of a crop due to lost income as well as a potential food source for the family 
itself. In terms of the effect on people, it can make them sick, hindering their ability to 
live and work, especially if they live in an area that receives frequent spraying. The 
negative health effects can be more than just irritating. Colombia recently refused to 
continuing its aerial eradication program due to concerns that glyphosate causes cancer 
in people that it lands on (Neuman). Thus between murderous organizations in the 
countryside, internal displacement, loss of livelihood, and deadly chemicals, the lives of 





even as few of the goals are met, creating a list of “cons” more expansive than the 
“pros” of the policies.  
With all of the effects on citizens, the economy has been negatively affected as 
well. For one thing, many people cannot contribute to the economy if they are displaced 
or if their farm was taken by guerrillas. Another issue stems from the fact that there is 
not always a market for legal crops. Due to the lack of government presence in certain 
portions of the country as well as difficult terrain to traverse, accessing a market where 
a farmer can sell his crops might be impossible or too difficult to be profitable (Dion, 
405). Depending on where the farmer lives, growing a legal crop may be highly 
problematic due to soil and water conditions as well as the threat of accidental aerial 
eradication. In addition to those struggles, the price for legal crops is not very high 
which makes making a living very difficult for farmers, and the emphasis on the 
militarization of the War on Drugs hinders the availability for aid money to go towards 
economic or social programs. On the other hand, coca is a hardy plant that can grow in 
a variety of environments, and each plant can yield up to four harvests per year, helping 
to negate the drawbacks of possible aerial eradication (Guizado, 155). The price for 
coca leaves is often higher than that of many legal crops, especially those easy to grow, 
making it a more appealing option to those struggling to make a living. Lastly, the 
cartels and guerrillas are always looking for more coca to turn into cocaine, providing a 
permanent market for a farmer’s harvest creating guaranteed money. In other words, 
there is very little incentive to maintain or turn to legal crops on farms which is not 





Oil can also be at risk from the guerrillas, further hurting the Colombian 
economy. In retaliation for government actions against organizations like the FARC, 
such as targeting their cocaine trafficking activities or simply sending the military after 
the guerrillas to shut them down, guerrillas will often counter by exploding oil pipelines 
and other locations key to oil production to hurt the government in retaliation (Crandall, 
64). In this situation, the drug war and the guerrilla war combine to negatively impact 
the economy, it being difficult to tell which war is actually the cause of the issues. 
However, oil targeted retaliation cannot be ignored given that oil exports are a key 
factor in the economy, and thus any disruptions in oil production will cause problems 
for both the government and the citizens of Colombia (The World Factbook- 
Colombia). The militarization of the War on Drugs in Colombia only serves to 
exacerbate the situation as retaliation often occurs after actions taken against the 
guerrillas whether for drugs or other reasons. Therefore, the major impacts on the 
economy, disrupted oil and many incentives to not grow legal crops, is a major 
drawback to Plan Colombia. 
Several of these effects also result in helping the drug traffickers in addition to 
hurting civilians. Disenfranchised and displaced people provide a fertile recruitment 
pool for the guerrillas and perhaps for the paramilitary organizations as well, depending 
on need (LeoGrande, 3). With no farm or home, civilians become more susceptible to 
the recruitment tactics of guerrilla organizations, thus increasing their ranks as well as 
their need for money. This would result in an increased need to traffic drugs which is 





The targeted goals of policies like Plan Colombia were to decrease the amount 
of cocaine being produced in Colombia and shipped to the United States. However, 
these goals have not been the outcome as seen by increasing hectares of coca fields, 
increasing amounts of cocaine production, negligible variation in cocaine purity and 
price in the United States, minimal decrease in the number of cocaine users in the 
United States, and the continued fight between cocaine producers and traffickers against 
the Colombian government. Instead the outcome has been to hurt nature and the 
environment, disadvantage civilians through death and displacement, hinder legal 
economic growth, and help the guerrillas, one of the targets of the policies. Given that 
the ideas behind the policies seems logical, why is it that the current situation is the 
observed outcome instead of the desired goals? 
One cause of the situation is poorly implemented policies. For example, 
eradication of coca fields should result in the decrease of coca production, but there has 
to be more than just eradication. Follow through should occur to ensure that farmers are 
not replanting the coca plants once eradication has occurred, and an increase in a federal 
presence can help with the extended policy. New federal officers can also assist in 
providing subsidies and increasing market access. There also needs to be some method 
to make sure that field expansion cannot happen either, thus protecting the Amazon and 
preventing an increase in coca production. Eradication alone is not enough to solve the 
problem. 
The lack of follow through is not the only problem with the aerial eradication 
program. As stated before, aerial eradication is not a very precise practice regardless of 





divert the sprayed glyphosate away from the coca fields and towards legal crops, natural 
flora, animals, and people. The inaccuracy of the program contributes to its inability to 
create the desired outcome of the policy, and the lack of follow through only 
exacerbates the issues.  
Another source contributing to the current situation is the lack of sufficient 
oversight and accountability. Although the paramilitaries are highly illegal, they often 
function with complete impunity as the military looks the other way from massacres 
and other human rights violations. There are even times when they receive active 
support from the military (LeoGrande, 5). These groups are focused in their goal of 
targeting guerilla organizations, and civilians become the collateral damage of their 
goal, and the paramilitary organizations also often use drugs to further fund their 
operations. Therefore, without sufficient oversight of the military to prevent support of 
paramilitaries, human rights violations flourish, and American money tangentially 
contributes to an increase in drug trafficking and production due to the military 
corruption and the lack of sufficient oversight to prevent and counter it. Therefore, the 
policy of giving money and power to the military ends up working against its goals of 
reducing terror and drug trafficking due to an incomplete policy.  
Lastly, poorly focused polices have only helped to exacerbate the problems of 
the current situation as well. For example, there is not enough focus on civilians instead 
of drug traffickers. For example, many of the cocaine producers do not grow their own 
coca, hence the high prices offered for it which then incentivize civilians to produce 
coca (Dion, 407). If there were policies oriented around providing support to civilian 





production might be a more viable goal, thus working towards the decrease in cocaine 
production as well. This would also require policies to help increase market access for 
the farmers, an idea that might prove problematic for many policy makers given that 
those policies are not specifically anti-drug policies. However, given the poor current 
situation, a focus reorientation might result in a change in the situation for the better.  
Another aspect of the poorly focused policies is the high emphasis on the “stick” 
over the “carrot.” The policies are mostly punishments with only minimal ways to help 
reduce the causes that push some people towards participating in the drug trade. For 
example, policies to help reduce poverty and increase the prices of legal crops would 
provide incentives to leave the drug trade rather than just punishing people for 
participating as they do what they have to in order to survive (Reyes, 71). A similar 
issue is the lack of incentives to avoid enabling the drug trade. Corruption in the police 
is related to low salaries, and so finding ways to provide higher salaries for police 
officers and public officials might decrease corruption. With less willingness to accept 
bribes from cartels and other drug traffickers, there should be a decrease in the 
influence of drug traffickers as well as their relative freedom of movement around the 
country (LeoGrande, 3). On the other hand, there is not sufficient punishment for those 
highly active and important in the drug trade. Some people who are arrested get 
extradited to the United States, but the justice system in Colombia is strangled by 
judges scared to deliver sentences for drug traffickers due to the threats delivered and 
carried out against judges and their families, starting during the 1990s under the reign of 
Pablo Escobar and his policy of plata o plomo, a bribe or death (Bowden, 24). Although 





recently started straightening itself out (Crandall, 63). Further strengthening of the 
judicial system would increase incentives for the more powerful to get out of the drug 
trade, thus potentially decreasing drug production and trafficking through judicial 





New Policies for the War on Drugs 
When devising new policies for the War on Drugs, several categories become 
evident when classifying the policies. The first category is targeting coca production. 
This includes the obvious policies like manual eradication as well as not so obvious 
ones like subsidies to try and reduce the incentive for farmers to start or continue coca 
production. The second category is strengthening the Colombian government. With a 
stronger government, there will be less impunity for the cocaine traffickers as a stronger 
judicial system will keep them in prison, and there will be less freedom of movement 
for the cocaine traffickers. Along with that, there needs to be the corresponding policies 
to counter corruption among all of the new government positions. The third set of 
policies involves forming peace with the guerrillas. Although their main goal is not to 
traffic cocaine, they will continue to do so as long as they need to support a fight against 
the Colombian government.  
However, not all of the policy changes need to occur in Colombia. The United 
States needs to put more time and effort into its demand-side policies. Imprisonment for 
drug offenders is not the most effective solution for drug users, and thus there needs to 
be a greater focus on treatment options. Lastly, the United States should focus on 
making its policies as productive as possible. This includes attempting to focus on 
streamlining its policies to focus on the War on Drugs rather than things like pork barrel 
policies as well as extending the policies to other countries where the drug problem may 
spread. There are lots of components to creating the new set of policies, but the more 






Targeting Coca Production 
The first set of policies involves targeting coca production. Without coca, there 
is no cocaine as it is the main ingredient in cocaine. This can be done in a variety of 
ways. The most obvious method is by removing coca plants, and this is better done 
through manual eradication than aerial given the human end environmental side effects 
of aerial eradication. Another way is by providing subsidies for the production of legal 
crops. This will increase the profit of farmers, high enough for the farmers to support 
themselves and their families, which will remove the main economic incentive for 
farmers to grow coca. A third way of targeting coca production, related to aiding 
farmers, is providing greater market access for farmers in remote areas. If the farmers 
cannot sell their products, then even subsidies will not provide an incentive for them to 
stop producing coca.  
Manual Eradication 
The most obvious way to target coca production is by targeting the plants 
themselves. Currently, the most common policy is aerial eradication, although there has 
been a decrease in spraying. One of those reasons is the inability to control the exact 
recipient of aerially sprayed glyphosate results in it landing on humans, animals, legal 
crops, and natural flora rather than only coca. Eradication of coca plants helps reduce 
the amount of coca produced, thus hindering cocaine production, but manual 
eradication should replace aerial eradication in the future to counter the environmental 
and human consequences. As previously stated, Colombia has recently terminated their 
support of glyphosate spraying of coca in Colombia, countering American goals for 





There are more benefits to manual instead of aerial eradication than just 
accuracy. For example, manual eradication provides the ability to move further out into 
the country away from urban areas. Aerial eradication can only take place so far away 
from an airport due to the somewhat limited range of the helicopters needed to protect 
the unarmed spraying planes (Reyes, 73). With manual eradication, not only could the 
eradicators be armed themselves, having more guards would be an option as well. If one 
eradication team had a base of operations, it could move out into the countryside, 
establish itself, and then provide a launching point for another eradication team to move 
further into the countryside. This would reduce the coca growers’ ability to move out of 
range of eradication since men on foot could simply keep following them. There is also 
the benefit of saved costs due to not needing helicopters anymore, maintenance or 
replacement, as well as no more risk to pilots.  
Although there would be no more need for pilots, manual eradication will 
logically require a lot of workers to go out to coca fields and then cut down the plants. 
One group of personnel that would be good for this job is the police. This would enable 
them to have a larger presence in certain areas of the country where a government 
presence has previously been weak or entirely missing (Crandall, 62). This increased 
presence will also help ensure that farmers are not replanting coca after eradication has 
occurred. Therefore, this policy is more comprehensive than aerial eradication since 
there is action, the eradication, and follow up, supervision to help prevent replanting of 
coca. And while increasing the military and government presence, there needs to be an 
increase in personnel salaries. Without sufficient payment, the temptation for joining in 





will lead to an increase in corruption, making the policy counterproductive. This 
temptation is seen in Mexico and Brazil where police officers take bribes or commit 
other crimes for the money necessary to support their families (Williams, Hubert, 89-
90) With higher salaries, there should be less incentive to help the cocaine traffickers.  
Additionally, greater training can help prevent corruption and human rights 
violations. With the proper training, military personnel, like police offers, can learn 
what their job is to do, where their authority and power end, and how to respect human 
rights (Williams, Hubert, 88-89). With this greater knowledge, there should come better 
behavior as the military personnel know better the limits of their power. Hopefully, with 
sufficient training, the responsibility to the people will begin to be passed down from 
officer to officer, reducing the amount of corruption along with the increased salaries 
that can make greater respect for human rights and the rule of law easier to do. 
While aerial eradication might be the more prevalent policy currently, that does 
not mean that there has not been manual eradication before. It is the less preferred 
policy though due to it being more expensive per hectare eradicated (Reyes, 72). These 
previous efforts show that there is a framework for implementation of greater manual 
eradication, something that should help ease the transition of relying on one form of 
eradication to the other. Expanding a previous policy also creates a sense of familiarity 
in terms of policy which should help counter possible concern over newer policy ideas. 
Manual eradication continues part of a policy that people know can be beneficial in 
terms of fewer hectares used for coca growth without the negative side effects like 
spraying humans with glyphosate. In fact, it has become more common along the 





Thus it helps ease people into the transition from old policies to new policies while still 
focusing on minimizing the negative impact on Colombia and increasing the policies’ 
level of comprehensiveness.  
Unfortunately, the change from aerial to manual eradication does not address the 
environmental issue of coca farmers spreading into the Amazon. What could be even 
worse is that if manual eradication proves to be equally or more efficient than aerial 
eradication in the long run, there would be an even greater incentive for coca growers to 
move into the Amazon and increase deforestation. One way to decrease the incentive to 
find new land for coca plants would be to decrease the demand for cocaine. Without the 
demand to meet, there would be less need to increase the hectares of land being used to 
grow coca. However, until there is less need for coca, the environmental impact of coca 
production will continue, or perhaps until anti-coca policies prove sufficient enough to 
severely impact coca production. Therefore, the best way to protect the Amazon and the 
environment from further degradation will be to implement the suggested policies, 
reduce the need for coca and cocaine, and thus reduce the need to expand into the 
Amazon forest for farmland.  
Providing Subsidies for Legal Crops 
Many of the producers of coca are poor farmers, and there are multiple 
incentives for them to enter into coca production for the many cocaine producers. For 
example, there is no guarantee that growing legal products will provide enough income 
for a famer and his family. Compared to coca, which grows in many regions without too 
much trouble, legal crops are more likely to fail due to perishability and lack of 





lot higher than that of legal crops. Therefore, the incentive to grow legal crops is still 
somewhat lacking.  
Subsidies to raise the price of legal crops could provide the added incentive 
needed for farmers to turn away from coca production. Although raising the price to 
coca levels might prove to be too expensive for the government, raising the prices 
enough that farmers and their families can survive should be sufficient, especially with 
increased market access. Whether a famer willingly turns away from growing coca or 
has to do so after manual eradication efforts, subsidies should be given to support 
farmers and support the loss of coca production. Subsidies target coca production rather 
than targeting cocaine traffickers directly, removing their base of support and the main 
ingredient of the traffickers’ product as fewer people are desperate enough to turn 
toward coca production to make enough profit to survive.  
One of the most positive aspects of this policy is that it is nonviolent. Subsidies 
can be distributed to farmers without harming anyone, thus reducing coca production 
without the concern of wounding or killing civilians who are only involved with drugs 
because it appears to be the only way to survive. This serves not only to fight the War 
on Drugs but also prevents the same issues experienced under current anti-drug policies 
like the continued production of large amounts of coca.  
Dispersing the money for subsidies can prove to be highly problematic though. 
While the government can give out the money, there is always the issue of corruption to 
worry about. However, there are ways to counter corruption, such as intense oversight 
of the officials in charge of handing out the subsidies. Later, an increase in government 





there are programs being instituted for greater oversight of the military and the police, 
then a similar program can be applied to those who are handing out the money for 
subsidies. Also, an increased government presence in remote areas of Colombia, means 
there will already be officials in place to give out the money.  
Another issue stems from farmers and the possibility that they will try to defraud 
the system by growing coca on their farm while claiming to grow something else and 
earning the subsidy for it (Guizado, 157). Farmers can even continue to grow coca 
while growing legal crops at the same time, thus getting the benefits of high coca prices 
and subsidies at the same time. However, there are ways to prevent both of these issues. 
For example, once the personnel in charge of manual eradication have gone through and 
eradicated all of the coca in the area, a group can make regular sweeps of all of the 
farms to make sure that coca is not being grown again. Any farmer found growing coca 
can then be charged a fine, written up, or lose some portion of his subsidy money for his 
legal crops. Another solution involves requiring proof of sale of the reported crops 
before a farmer can receive his subsidy funds. For example, if a farmer grows corn, he 
will harvest it and sell it at the market. After that, he can go to an office, present proof 
of the sale, and then he can receive subsidy money based on how much of his crop he 
sold. The government official can mark the documents he presented so that they cannot 
be used again at a different office. A system like this should make receiving subsidies 
for crops not grown rather challenging for a farmer trying to receive more subsidy 
money than he should.  
Although subsidies will be expensive, they provide a way to reduce the amount 





Given that increased incentives to grow legal crops should result in an increase in said 
crops, there will be a corresponding growth in the legal economy which should help pay 
for the subsidies through increased tax revenue.  
Increasing Legal Market Access 
While subsidies work to incentivize farmers not to grow coca, that is not the 
only action that should be taken. One of the struggles for farmers who are dedicated to 
growing legal crops is the inability to access a legal market (Guizado, 158). Without 
somewhere to sell one’s harvest, the cost of the crop, the hardiness of the plant, and the 
ease of farming don’t matter. No market means no sales and no income. This can drive 
farmers to plant illegal crops, like coca, because there is a guaranteed market for the 
harvest, and cocaine producers are generally in the same area, making a buyer easy to 
find for a farmer’s crop. Given that the government generally has a weak presence 
where the majority of coca is grown, this proximity between coca producers and coca 
buyers is especially true (Guizado, 157; Dion, 406). Making legal crops profitable 
provides a major incentive for farmers to turn away from growing coca while increasing 
access to markets for legal crops enables farmers to not depend on subsidies while 
providing a second source of income for the crops, two policies that should reduce the 
amount of coca grown.  
In order to facilitate greater market access, roads are needed to let farmers take 
their goods to where they can be purchased, whether by large companies that will sell 
them later overseas or by locals who have grocery stores or are buying for their homes. 
Maintenance of the roads would be costly, but with greater farmer profits, there should 





towards paying for the upkeep of the roads. In addition, if there are more government 
officials in the remote areas, like those needed for manual eradication of coca, the 
government will need to use the roads as well, increasing the likelihood of maintenance 
which means that providing greater market access would be a long term solution for 
fighting the War on Drugs. Instead of seeing a few years of decreased coca production 
until the roads wore out, thus once again hindering market access and therefore 
increasing the interest in coca production again, there should be a permanent decrease in 
the amount of coca produced in Colombia.  
Another benefit to the increase in roads and market access is the boost to the 
economy due to greater production. With more goods entering the legal economy, 
Colombia will receive an increase in taxes which can be used for a variety of things, not 
just road maintenance (Piana). This could help improve conditions for many people in 
Colombia living in slums or could provide the money needed to increase military 
oversight to protect civilians during the War on Drugs. It could also result in a decrease 
in the black market in Colombia which could help lower other forms of crime as money 
is taken out of the illegal market in Colombia.  
However, the greatest benefit of increasing the number of roads in Colombia is 
that it would result in a decrease in the amount of coca produced. With less coca being 
grown, there will be less materials with which to create cocaine, especially very pure 
cocaine. In reaction, drug traffickers might turn towards other sources of coca, such as 
moving into the Amazon. Unfortunately for them, the benefit to a comprehensive policy 
package is that there are portions to prevent that from becoming an issue. With an 





service, the drug traffickers would be unable to move into the Amazon. Therefore, they 
would be pinched between several different policies and unable to find more hectares to 
use for coca, thus forcing coca and cocaine production levels down permanently.  
With less coca being grown and thus less cocaine being made, there are several 
positive results that cascade out from these policies. The power and influence of cocaine 
traffickers would decrease as they are unable to maintain their high levels and 
production and therefore profits due to the decrease in available coca. This should result 
in a decrease in violence in Colombia as there would be less to fight over and to protect 
as well as less money to finance the fighting. There should also be a decrease in the 
number of traffickers as the high rewards for high risks drop to minimal rewards once 
there is less money in the system. Lastly, there would be less cocaine entering the 
United States and thus fewer people using and abusing the drug. Targeting coca 
production is a vital aspect of the War on Drugs, but it must be done in more than one 
way with policies that focus on more than just the plant itself. 
Creating a Stronger Government 
None of the previously mentioned policies will be effective if there is no 
government to support the policies and ensure that they are carried out and sufficiently 
funded. Therefore, there needs to be a conscious effort to strengthen the Colombian 
government and expand its presence throughout the entire country. This will enable all 
of the policies to be enacted as well as reduce the power of the guerrillas once civilians 
have someone else to turn to for support. The strengthened government will also then 
have the ability to enact greater oversight of the military, alone or with international 





more than hindering the production of coca is needed to end cocaine production. 
Cocaine traffickers and producers need to be punished for their crimes, and that can 
only be done under a strong, fully functioning judicial system. A functioning judicial 
system will support a stronger government, and the two should function together to 
further hinder cocaine production and trafficking.  
Increasing the Government’s Presence Throughout Colombia 
Increasing the government’s presence in more parts of Colombia is the first step 
toward strengthening the government. As previously stated, coca is often grown where 
the government’s presence is weakest, a clear reason to expand the government 
(Guizado, 157). There are other reasons as well, such as the previously mentioned 
manual eradication process. With more government officials in far flung areas, ones 
where coca growers like to go because of the low government presence, it will be easier 
to watch over the process. This provides the ability to prevent civilians from actions that 
work counter to the goal of eradicating drugs, such as replanting coca after eradicators 
have passed through a farmer’s field. Another benefit would be the possibility of 
creating an agency along the lines of the forest protection service. With more 
government officials near the Amazon, ones who are scientists or environmentalists 
perhaps, there could be an effort to prevent further deforestation of the Amazon and 
perhaps even start a program to replant some of the trees that have been removed. Not 
only would officials near the Amazon serve to dissuade coca growers from expanding 
into the Amazon, they could work to counter the negative environmental effects of 





Before sending out officials to more remote regions, there needs to be various 
programs to educate the officials about the lifestyle and situation in whichever region 
they are visiting. Having officials who have no idea of the reality of the local situation 
can make implementing policies more difficult since more knowledge about an area 
enables individualized polices that can then be more effective. For example, when 
discussing development, Vicky Randall, a professor in the Department of Government 
at the University of Essex, mentions the need for differentiated policies at the national 
level in order to successfully combat underdevelopment rather than lumping all of the 
nations together into the “Third World” category and applying one policy (6-8). 
Although cultural diversity within a nation is less than that between nations, different 
geography, different people, and more can provide enough diversity that a certain level 
of specialized attention by government officials could only be beneficial. There should 
still be a basic standard focus for all of the officials, helping farmers to stop growing 
coca, oversee eradicators to avoid abuses of power, and so on, each region might need a 
different policy with which to do that. Even within a country, policies should not be one 
size fits all.  
One power that all officials must have is the ability to punish any official who 
abuses his power in any way or takes advantage of his position in efforts to fight as 
much corruption as possible. This could include taking bribes, applying the law 
unfairly, allowing farmers to grow coca in certain areas along with their legal crops, and 
more. If there is no oversight or punishment for inappropriate and unlawful actions, the 
increase of government presence would most likely result in a correspondingly large 





fighting the War on Drugs, but corruption can be reduced through “accountability and 
transparency” (Dion, 419). Although it might prove to be somewhat of a hassle, using 
an official from one area or district to check up on an official in another might be the 
most effective way to reduce corruption due to the lack of ties the oversight official 
would have to the area. To make sure that no official has to travel too far, which makes 
the trip cost prohibitive, officials could help the districts closest to them, alternating 
officials each time.  
In addition to greater oversight of other policies, there are several benefits that 
would come from an increased government presence. One is a reduction in the power 
and influence of the guerrilla organizations. With no government presence to control the 
area, it is rather simple for guerrillas to take and maintain control over civilians through 
various means, like fear (Dion, 406). If the government is in the region though, then the 
people have another power to turn to for actions such as governing. There would be no 
more need for guerrillas to step in. With fewer people depending upon the guerrillas, by 
force or by choice, the support base for the guerrillas shrinks which in turn reduces their 
power and freedom and ability to act.  
With a decrease in guerrilla power comes an increase in civilian safety, another 
benefit of increased government presence. For example, the threat of displacement for 
civilians who are unwilling to work for or with the guerrillas vanishes, letting people 
live their lives and turn toward legal means of production (De La Asuncion, 440). There 
should also be a decrease in human rights violations because the guerrillas will have 





officials also means that more guerrillas could be arrested, further reducing the power of 
guerrilla organizations, assuming a corresponding strengthening of the judicial system.  
An increase in government presence could have a negative outcome, increasing 
levels of corruption more than helping civilians in the areas. However, with proper 
oversight, it can help further the policies focused on the War on Drugs, like the manual 
eradication of coca. It can also reduce the power and influence of guerrilla organizations 
which should lead to a decrease in cocaine production given that guerrillas depend on 
cocaine to fund their fight. With less power, there is less for them to fund and do. 
Lastly, it helps increase the safety of civilians which works to counter and attempt to 
prevent the same atrocities seen under current policies in regards to displacement and 
human rights violations. Although risky due to the possibility of corruption, when done 
properly, an increase of the government’s presence into more regions of Colombia is a 
good step towards reducing and eliminating cocaine production.  
Greater Oversight of the Military 
Over the course of the past decades of the War on Drugs, there have been many 
human rights violations committed by the military as well as corruption. Greater 
oversight could help prevent the continuation of such higher numbers of violations as 
well as the ties between the military and illegal paramilitary organizations. In Mexico, 
the organization Human Rights Watch criticized President Calderon for allowing the 
military to investigate allegations of military wrongdoing as it rarely results in bringing 
soldiers to justice. Therefore, it should be put into civilian hands so that justice might be 
done and ending the “dysfunctional justice system” (Wilkinson). However, civilian 





happen, then perhaps there would be less need for judicial hearings as the issues would 
be prevented before they occurred. Due to the previously mentioned expansion of the 
Colombian government, there will be more officials available to be near military 
actions, thus able to provide oversight. However, using Colombian officials might not 
be the soundest idea given how easily corruption can spread within a government.  
Thus military oversight should be provided by a different entity, one that could 
be watched itself to ensure that it does not overstep its boundaries and violate 
Colombian sovereignty. This could be the UN, AS it is a nonbiased organization, and 
the family members of officials would be further away than those of Colombian 
officials. While the officials would be in Colombia to watch over the military, there is 
also a need to prevent cocaine traffickers from attempting to find leverage against the 
oversight officials in case they wish to have a military and an oversight official on their 
side. If Colombia wanted officials with a little more personal knowledge about the drug 
and cocaine situation, a delegation of officials from various Latin American countries 
might be used instead. Their family members live outside of Colombia as well, and this 
kind of action would create Latin American cooperation across all nations working 
together to fight the War on Drugs. There have been conventions held by Latin 
American countries before, looking for new ways to fight against drugs, and creating an 
oversight committee for the Colombian military might be a goal of one such future 
convention (Sorj). These international officials could also coordinate with local 
officials. This would give Colombia a little more control over what occurs within its 





a better understanding of the local situation, similar to the training that Colombian 
officials should receive before heading out into the more remote regions of Colombia.  
This committee could have various different jobs. One could be to double check 
all plans of action before they occur. For example, before taking out a cocaine 
laboratory, it could make sure that there is enough evidence to carry through with the 
operation, that all exits are covered, that the personnel involved are sufficiently trained, 
and so on. Another thing could be the use of body cameras for all military personnel in 
the field. Although they would not be very proactive tools, as the footage is reviewed 
after events occur, military personnel would be held accountable for their actions while 
in the field, an idea that is spreading in the United States in regards to police violence 
(Lewinski). This could prevent future human rights violations and prevent occurrences 
like false positives, when the military kills civilians then dress them up as guerrillas to 
help increase statistics for their War on Drugs (Daniels), thus helping to protect citizens 
and keep corruption down.  
However, body cameras would only prove useful if there were direct and 
appropriate consequences for inappropriate action. If a member of the military is 
recorded committing a human rights violation, permitting a paramilitary organization to 
do something illegal, creating a false positive, and so on, appropriate consequences 
must occur. If enough men are discharged for illegal behavior or suspended or 
otherwise punished depending on the severity of their transgression, then other military 
personnel should be less likely to commit the same offenses themselves. This is based 
in the concepts of punishments and negative reinforcement to influence people’s 





depending on the crime, would also serve to clean out the military, removing those most 
likely to break the rules, and thus providing Colombia with a more loyal, more capable 
military.  
The greatest benefit to increased oversight of the military is the ability to reduce 
and eventually sever the links between the military and various paramilitary 
organizations. Without the military looking the other way while paramilitary 
organizations act, and without the military actively participating with the paramilitary 
organizations, there should be an increase in arrests and prosecutions of paramilitary 
members committing human rights violations and otherwise breaking the law 
(LeoGrande, 5). This will reduce the amount of violence in Colombia as the 
paramilitary organizations are hindered due to lack of freedom of movement. With a 
lessened ability to act without repercussion, the amount of massacres committed should 
decrease which would provide the citizens of Colombia with a safer place to live, giving 
them longer lives and a much lower threat of displacement. It could also make peace 
talks with guerrillas easier as they would experience a reduced number of attacks from 
paramilitary organizations, thus perhaps making them more willing to lay down arms in 
order to begin peace negotiations.  
Permitting foreigners to watch over and keep track of military personnel is not 
likely to be a favorable policy, but the advantages are there. There should be less 
violence as military personnel are held accountable for their actions as well as less 
corruption as links to paramilitary organizations are severed. Therefore, the supply-side 
aspect of the War against Drugs should be more effective as the military becomes more 





and pervasiveness of human rights violations decreases. While a foreign presence might 
not be a popular idea, greater military oversight is valuable when fighting the War on 
Drugs. 
Addressing the Issue of Human Rights 
As state above, greater oversight of the military can reduce the violence and 
human rights violations in Colombia. Military personnel will have less impunity to 
cause them, paramilitary organizations will have less freedom to cause them, and the 
guerrillas will have less reason to cause them. However, it is not just Colombian 
policies that must change to fully protect human rights. American policies much reflect 
the desire to protect civilians as well. When the United States passed Plan Colombia, 
politicians removed the requirement for the military and the government to maintain a 
certain level of respect for human rights in Colombia (Massey, 280). Although 
improving human rights will not directly lead to a decrease in cocaine production and 
trafficking, that does not mean that they do not need protecting. When creating new 
policies to fight drugs, the United States must recommit to protection human rights once 
again.  
Reducing the amount of cocaine produced and trafficked might appear to be the 
more important goal, because it will save many lives with the decrease in violence 
around cocaine production as well as cocaine consumption. However, reducing human 
rights violations should save just as many, if not more, people. For example, many of 
the human rights violations stem from the military, guerrilla groups, and paramilitary 
organizations attempting to reach their various goals (De La Asuncion, 449; 





maintain a certain level of human rights protection, it could not have the same links to 
the paramilitary organizations that it has had. This would reduce the influence and 
power of the paramilitary organizations, thus hindering their ability to massacre entire 
villages with impunity and lowering the need for the guerrillas to retaliate in kind.  
Yes, reducing the power and influence of the guerrillas and the paramilitary 
organizations that rely on drugs for funding should also reduce the number of human 
rights violations. Without anything illegal to protect at all cost, there will be no need for 
the kind of violence that has been seen. However, it would be a great injustice to allow 
the human rights violations to continue while attempting to end them through targeting 
the perpetuators for cocaine production and trafficking. There should be policies 
implemented to show that the American government will protect human rights directly, 
not as an afterthought or side effect.  
One concrete way of attempting to put human rights first is by rescinding the 
waiver that allows Congress to give aid money to the Colombian military regardless of 
its track record with human rights. If Colombia is as dedicated to the War on Drugs as it 
appears to be, then there should not be too much opposition to cleaning up the military 
so that aid money can be delivered. Additionally, the greater oversight of the military 
previously mentioned to prevent corruption will be used to ensure that military 
personnel are protecting human rights, not just saying that they are. Immediately cutting 
off all funds to Colombia until its human rights record improves would not be a good 
policy as it would make the aforementioned policies incredibly difficult to fund. 
However, provisions can be put into place that provide money for non-militarized 





its aid money as its record with human rights improves. Therefore, the War on Drugs in 
Colombia would continue while the actors in the government would improve at the 
same time.  
While not necessarily ideal for the War on Drugs, proceeding without protecting 
human rights is not a good idea. It creates a modern precedent that the ends justify the 
means. In other words, one of the strongest nations in the world is projecting the idea 
that as long as the end goal is met, the means are not as important. This is not true and is 
a rather dangerous precedent as can be seen in China. Economic development is the end 
goal, the means is fossil fuels, and the side effect is massive environmental problems, 
analogous to the human rights violations in Colombia (The Hidden Cost of Fossil 
Fuels). The ends do not justify the means, and the United States must step up and 
counter that concept by providing protection for human rights in any and all future 
policy packages that fight the War on Drugs.  
Strengthening the Judicial System 
In recent years, there has been an increase in conversations about working to 
create a stronger judicial system, the final aspect to strengthening the government. This 
includes efforts like progressing from oral complaints to written complaints that can be 
filed and followed through on (Crandall, 60, 63). Another important aspect of 
rebuilding the judicial system includes having judges capable of carrying out their job 
of sentencing drug traffickers. For example, during the time of Pablo Escobar, many 
judges protested their vulnerability to the drug traffickers if they sentenced anyone 
connected to the drug trade due to fear of their death or the death or kidnapping of a 





situation like that cannot arise again would be a positive as it enables the judicial system 
to be the main form of prosecution, not violence.  
There should be a decreased need for violence because the judicial system 
involves arrests, evidence, trials, lawyers, and such. This means, logically speaking, that 
if the War on Drugs was fought in the courtroom rather than in the countryside or on 
city streets, the levels of violence should decrease because the main action would take 
place in the courtroom rather than on the streets. Defending one’s territory or cocaine 
trafficking would take place in a courtroom with lawyers rather than with guns on the 
street. At a minimum, it should reduce the number of village-wide massacres once the 
villages are no longer the battlefield. Depending on who is on trial, there might be 
violence from supporters, but it would most likely be directed against police or military 
personnel, people who are trained for such actions and know how to react. Therefore, an 
increase in judicial sentencing provides a way to remove drug traffickers from the 
playing field without resorting to violence and death.  
With a stronger judicial system, with stronger rule of law, the decrease in 
violence will not be immediate. However, it will provide a system that citizens should 
learn to trust and respect over time as they see it arresting and sentencing cocaine 
producers and traffickers. Once that trust begins to build, citizens will begin to turn to 
the police and the legal system to handle issues with illegal behavior which will reduce 
the need for citizens to handle the issues themselves (Frühling, 6-9). This is what will 
reduce violence, the trust in the system, but there needs to be a system to trust before 





Additionally, having a stronger judicial system would do more than just provide 
a way to reduce the violence in Colombia. Like the United States, Colombia has a 
separation of power at the federal level which includes a judicial branch (Colombia). 
Without a strong judicial branch, there is uneven power which gives too much to either 
the executive or the legislative. This could prove to be a long-term problem for the 
entire country and thus a focus on the judicial system would be beneficial for the whole 
country, not just reducing drug related violence. 
Fortunately, building up the judicial system should not be too difficult. Since 
there already exists a system in Colombia, judges, politicians, and others would not 
have to start from scratch to accomplish this. There would need to be a focus on three 
things, one of which is finding judges who are qualified to serve in the courts. Another 
is ensuring that the judges are safe which can be done with police escorts and details for 
both the judges and their families. Lastly, there would need to be regular oversight to 
ensure that the judges are not being bribed to deliver lighter sentences for cocaine 
traffickers which could be done with a bipartisan commission assembled by the 
legislative branch. None of these actions should be too terribly difficult to implement, 
but the main issue will be to ensure that they continue in a fair manner so that the rebuilt 
and strengthened judicial system will not need to be overhauled again in twenty years or 
so.  
One of the major flaws of this plan is how to keep sentenced drug traffickers, 
sellers, and producers in jail once the trial has ended. As Pablo Escobar showed, the 
prison system is not always the most secure (Bowden, 133). Extradition has been a 





Colombia, they should serve out their prison time in Colombia. In order to carry 
through with that idea, prisons should be inspected and upgraded where necessary, and 
there should be greater oversight of the police as well to look for signs of bribes and 
other corruption to ensure that prisons stay prisons, not mini palaces for some of the 
prisoners. With up to date prisons and qualified, reliable, loyal guards and police, 
Colombia should be able to keep the sentenced people in jail.  
Guerrilla Peace Negotiations 
One aspect of cocaine trafficking that is often talked about but not necessarily 
directly addressed is the issue of the guerrilla fighters. Although the results of guerrilla 
actions are mentioned, such as massacres and forcing civilians to grow coca, there is not 
a lot of conversation around what to do to decrease the need for guerrillas to depend on 
cocaine trafficking. Although there have been peace negotiations before, they have 
never reached any conclusion that would stop the violence and need for drug trafficking 
(LeoGrande, 4-6). Thus attempting to restart peace negotiations and talks between the 
Colombian government and the guerrillas should be a key consideration in the War on 
Drugs. 
Before beginning the peace negotiations, the government must decide what it is 
willing to negotiate over, what concessions are realistic for it to consider, so that when 
negotiations begin, there is less wasted time discussing options that will never be 
accepted by the government. If each side is upfront with the other before negotiations 
begin, there should be a better chance of reaching a resolution. Another key factor will 
be finding officials who are willing to negotiate. If the government is willing to do so, 





conflict of interests might make it more challenging for them to accept a solid peace 
offering. Although, in theory, any official with the correct qualifications to negotiate 
with the guerrillas should be appropriate to assign the task, it cannot hurt to do 
everything one can to ensure success, especially given the outcomes of previous talks.  
In addition to the government deciding what is and is not on the table, there 
must be a ceasefire, an agreement from the guerrillas to lay down arms during the peace 
negotiations. This could show a willingness on the guerrillas’ part to negotiate as well 
as to reach a compromise. In the past, a ceasefire was used as a way for the guerrillas to 
test the boundaries of what they could do, but stricter rules around the ceasefire and the 
requirements for negotiations might help prevent that from happening again 
(LeoGrande, 9). Negotiation alone does not necessarily mean that they want to reach an 
agreement; it might be an excuse to waste time for some other reason. Unfortunately, 
without a serious desire to reach a negotiated resolution between the government and 
the guerrillas, negotiations will most likely not be successful.  
However, if peace can be reached, the benefits for both Colombia and the War 
on Drugs will be numerous. One benefit would be fewer attacks on oil production. 
Guerrillas often target oil pipelines with bombs, disrupting oil production which hurts 
Colombia as a whole given that oil is a large part of its economy (Crandall, 64; The 
World Factbook- Colombia). Without these attacks, oil production should be smoother 
and would not have as many losses, thus increasing output and profit for Colombia, 
whether directly through sales, with taxes, or both. The greater profit for the Colombian 
government can increase the funds for other policies, further helping the War on Drugs. 





of people capable of participating in the legal economy. Once no longer fighting the 
government, guerrillas and their families still have to support themselves, and this 
economic activity would be a part of the legal economy, again increasing taxes and 
increasing the economy with greater production.  
In fact, the Council on Foreign Relations has reported that there are negotiations 
currently happening right now that started in 2015. Several of the steps that are being 
taken follow similar guidelines to what I have mentioned. For example, there are six 
points that have been decided on that each side must agree to for peace to be reached, 
including “eradication illegal crops and drug trafficking.” There is also a focus on 
disarming the guerrillas and allowing them to rejoin the general population, becoming 
regular civilians once again (Renwick).  
In regards to cocaine, there are several benefits to reaching peace between the 
government and the guerrillas. The first related to cocaine in the sense that the guerrillas 
should not need to or be able to produce or traffic cocaine after making peace with the 
government. If the cessation of cocaine production and trafficking is a requirement of 
the government for peace, then there should be a dramatic drop in cocaine production 
immediately, especially if all materials and supplies used by the guerrillas are destroyed 
at the same time. Secondly, once the guerrillas and their families enter the legal 
economy and general society once again, maintaining the same large-scale cocaine 
production efforts for other actors remaining in the business should be incredibly 
difficult if not impossible, thus aiding the continued decrease in cocaine production 
given that the gap that would need filling will be rather large. And third, without the 





and no enemy anymore. With no more excuses to fight, they should not need to fund 
themselves and thus would not need to produce and traffic cocaine for funds anymore. 
Although reaching peace between the government and the guerrillas would not end the 
cocaine production and trafficking in Colombia, it should create a serious reduction in 
cocaine levels by taking out a large number of actors.  
Peace between the government and the guerrillas would also result in less 
violence. Not only would the guerrillas not attack the government anymore, there would 
be no need to attack civilians either. With no need to force compliance with coca or 
cocaine production or support for the guerrilla organization, civilians should be safer 
and under less threat of human rights violations. Additionally, the paramilitary 
organizations would not be fighting the guerrillas anymore or be threatening civilians 
either. Reaching peace will not only provide a serious blow in the War on Drugs, but it 
will go a long way in helping rebuild Colombia into a safer country. 
Demand-Side Policies 
Other than the need for Americans to recommit to protecting human rights, the 
previously mentioned policies all occur within Colombia. It is in Colombia that the coca 
is grown. It is in Colombia that the judicial system is struggling. However, it is the 
United States that the majority of the cocaine is consumed. Therefore, there should be 
policy changes within the United States as well to help focus on the consumption of 
cocaine. Without consumers, there are no profits. Therefore, the United States should 
focus on policies to help both abusers and users, treatment programs unrelated to 
prisons, as well as decreased punishments for drug possession. Although treatments and 





War on Drugs, so the policies should be reexamined and reevaluated to create more 
effective policies.  
Drug Treatment Programs and Alternatives to Prison 
Drug treatment has been proven to be very effective, especially compared to 
supply-side policies in reducing drugs user numbers (Massey, 282). This high level of 
success alone should be sufficient to increase support for more expansive drug 
treatment programs as well as to research into more effective programs. Unfortunately, 
there is not sufficient support, monetarily or otherwise, due to the emphasis placed on 
prohibition, and thus prison is often where drug users end up. There are drug treatment 
programs in prisons, but they are not the most effective. Additionally, placing drug 
users and abuser in prison is not necessarily the correct response, especially for those 
charged with possession rather than those arrested for some other crime while under the 
influence of drugs. For example, drug treatment programs in prisons are not very 
effective for a variety of reasons, and are additionally hindered by the proliferation of 
drugs in prisons (Peters; Drugs Inside Prison Walls). Treatment programs outside of 
prisons will enable users to get clean without being labeled an ex-con which will give 
them greater opportunities post treatment when trying to find employment, something 
that should help them stay clean post treatment.  
One aspect of removing the link between treatment and prison involves 
recognizing that drug addiction is a disease (Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction). 
It is a mental condition that influences some people more than others, and those who are 
affected should not be punished so severely for something that is not an entirely 





incompetent to stand trial are placed in hospitals to serve out their sentences and to 
receive treatment, then why can’t someone who committed a crime because of their 
drug addiction receive treatment in a place designed to help them rather than punish 
them? The focus should be the root of the problem, the addiction, not consequences 
when trying to decide on corrective punishments. Given that cocaine user rates have not 
fluctuated much under prohibition and prison sentences, it is clear the punishment 
enough is not sufficient to reduce the number of users (Robinson, 210). It’s time to try 
something else, treatment outside of prison, that is proven to help people and make a 
difference in something other than the prison population.  
For people arrested under the influence, separate facilities that focus on drug use 
treatment as well as rehabilitation should be used. If people who commit crimes due to 
insanity receive special care and rehabilitation designed to their issues, then why not 
those who commit crimes due to drug use? This does not mean that the accused do not 
serve time for the crimes that they committed but that they serve them in a facility that 
provides the help that they need. If Americans want prison and prohibition to work, then 
there need to be programs that focus on what works, such as treatment, rather than just 
general prison time.  
Sentences for Drug Possession 
For those who are arrested with drugs, there are policies in place to serve long 
sentences based on the drug and the quantity of it. However, all this does is increase the 
number of people in prison and disproportionally affect non-white citizens (Ingraham). 
This does not decrease the number of possible drug users, just change where they are 





is caught possessing an illegal drug, rather than arresting the person, requiring a fine to 
be paid or community service provides a better option. While drug abusers are 
considered likely to be violent or commit a crime, people who only use drugs, not abuse 
them, are not a menace to society assuming that they use in the privacy of their own 
home. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the dangers of using at home in 
regards to safety of others in the home, but it is a much different threat than one posed 
by someone high on cocaine in public.  
To provide a sort of halfway ground between criminalization and 
decriminalization, there could be a policy similar to traffic violations. The first two or 
so violations might be accompanied by fines that go on a driver’s record, but after 
enough violations, drivers might have their licenses suspended (Traffic Ticket 
Consequences). A similar system could be set up for those who are caught possessing 
drugs. The first few possessions are handled with a ticket and a mark on the possessor’s 
record, but enough possessions results in something more severe, such as a short prison 
term or community service. Years long prison sentences are not reducing the 
availability of drugs or the number of people using drugs, and so something new must 
be tried.  
Further Points for the United States 
All of the previously mentioned policies should help reduce the amount of 
cocaine produced and trafficked in Colombia and the United States. However, no matter 
how successful the policies should be, poor focus and poor implementation of the 
policies could ruin the chances of success, resulting in yet another set of policies that 





the need to orient policies toward fighting drugs and nothing else. While pork barrel 
policies are common and unavoidable, that does not mean that they should define the 
policies designed and passed to fight the War on Drugs. For example, aerial eradication 
maintains high support because of Congressmen whose districts produce the helicopters 
used to protect the planes that do the spraying (Crandall, 60). Without a focus 
reorientation on drugs, framed perhaps as protecting future generations from such 
widespread drug production and availability, there will always be conflicting interests 
that will make creating an effective policy package difficult, thus drawing out the war 
and making it, perhaps, endless.  
Another clarification that should be made is if money is going to support the 
War on Drugs or the fight against guerrilla organizations. Although the guerrillas use 
cocaine trafficking to support various aspects of their operations, trying to reduce their 
cocaine production is a different goal than trying to reduce their influence and/or 
presence. Instead of sending money to fight the War on Drugs and having it used 
against the guerrillas as well, there should be a specific aid package that targets aiding 
the initiation of peace negotiations. Simply sending money to fight the guerrillas 
without any more guidance than that will not be effective. Clear, and concise uses for 
the aid money should produce the most positive results. Therefore, clarification does not 
mean that the United States cannot support Colombia’s efforts towards both ends, but 
there needs to be a separation of the policies.  
Trying to reorient policies to focus solely on one thing is challenging and most 
likely unrealistic. Unless there is enough public pressure around the issue, there is no 





to Colombia is for will help make a more productive War on Drugs. The most useful 
aspect is that with more focused policies to target the supply-side of drugs, there will be 
more money to focus on newer supply-side policies as well as new demand-side 
policies as well. This means that there should not be budgetary issues in terms of 
finding money for the United States to fund its changed policies which removes a 
stumbling block to implementing change.  
Lastly, although these policy changes are good, no matter what is done in 
Colombia, it is not the only portion of the cocaine picture. As the suggested policies 
should result in a much harder time growing coca and producing cocaine in Colombia, 
the Balloon Effect predicts that the growth and production will simply move to a 
different area, most likely back to Bolivia and Peru. In fact, these countries have 
recently seen a growth in coca production (LeoGrande, 3). Therefore, similar policies to 
the ones enacted in Colombia should be enacted in the other countries as well, like 
manual eradication, with the governments’ consent. If not, although the fight in 







Americans have been fighting a War on Drugs for decades. Although the goal is 
to reduce the impact of drugs on Americans, the War does not always stay within 
American borders. As Colombia shows, the United States has a large influence over the 
fight against drugs in other countries as well through various aid packages involving 
policies and money. Unfortunately, Colombia also shows that the consequences of the 
War are not always the desired ones.  
Over the past fifteen years or so, Colombia has seen many negative side effects 
of the policies implemented against drugs whether due to poor policies, poor 
implementation, or other reasons. There has been environmental damage as more than 
just coca is destroyed and as nothing prevents coca growers from moving into the 
Amazon to find new fields. There have been many civilians hurt through human rights 
violations such as massacres and internal displacement. Paramilitary organizations 
flourish as the military turns a blind eye further hurting civilians. Guerrillas continue to 
recruit and produce cocaine while avoiding government forces. And through it all, the 
situation in regards to drugs is hardly changing. 
In the United States, levels of cocaine use have hardly changed. The price on the 
street remains roughly the same as well as the purity of cocaine. Any small street price 
changes are most likely easily absorbed by the traffickers given the wide difference in 
street price and the price to produce. Thus, in regards to the goals of reducing cocaine 
production, trafficking, and use, the policies implemented in Colombia have failed.  
And so something else must be tried. Currently, there are countries trying new 





in the United States have legalized marijuana use as well (McKay). Although there is a 
large difference between marijuana use and cocaine use, the changed policies indicate a 
different time period, one in which there are more options that just prohibiting drugs 
and focusing on supply-side policies. Policy makers need to take advantage of the 
loosening stances and try something new along with the something old in hopes of 
finding something that finally reaches the long desired goals. 
Targeting coca is an old aspect of the War on Drugs, but the new policies take a 
different approach. They are more focused and hopefully accurate in two ways. The 
first goal is removing coca more accurately with manual rather than aerial eradication. 
The second involves attempting to incentivize farmers to grow legal crops to support 
themselves rather than coca through subsidies and better access to legal markets for 
their crops.  
Another aspect involves strengthening the government, both to better implement 
the policies against cocaine production and trafficking but also to help create a stronger 
country for the Colombian people. Coca flourishes where the government presence is 
weak, and thus there should be more officials in the country to help counter that and 
carry out policies as well as reduce the influence of the guerrillas. Greater oversight of 
the military will be an offshoot of that which can help reduce levels of violence as well 
as human rights violations. Although the focus is on removing cocaine production and 
trafficking, that does not mean that there should be efforts to counter negative side 
effects of the policies. Lastly, the judicial system should be strengthened so that the 





Peace with the guerrillas should be considered another aspect of ending the War 
on Drugs. If the guerrillas are no longer fighting the government, then they will no 
longer need profits from cocaine to fund their fight. Additionally, the increase of people 
in the legal economy and the halted attacks on oil production will help the economy 
which will help the country as a whole and help the government focus on implementing 
other policies.  
There need to be policy changes in the United States as well. Treatment should 
be the focus of helping drug users and abusers, not prison. While that does not mean 
that those arrested under the influence should not be punished, it does mean that the 
punishment could be more effective. The legal consequences for those caught 
possessing drugs rather than using them should also be less strict. Prison is not the 
answer for everything.  
And lastly, the United States should do its best to focus on policies that work, 
not the ones that bring money to a Congressman’s constituency. If money is the focus of 
policies instead of the drugs, then the War will continue to drag on. Spreading similar 
anti-drug policies to other countries will be important as well so that the problem is 
truly eradicated, not just moved from one location to another.  
Some of these policies have been suggested before. Some of them have been 
implemented before. However, it is the combination of all of them together that should 
make them the most effective. Instead of targeting just the effects of the cocaine trade, 
like violence, there are efforts to stop what causes the violence, like moving the struggle 
into the courtroom rather than the streets. Instead of just possibly removing coca with 





place, like with subsidies for legal crops. The polices also recognize some of the 
negative side effects of previous and suggested policies, and they work to counteract 
them as much as possible, like with the American reorientation on protecting human 
rights. There is no perfect set of policies that can guarantee to end the War on Drugs in 
a short period of time. There might not even be a set of policies that can guarantee to 
end the War on Drugs ever. However, these policies, when implemented together, 
should have the greatest positive effect in the War on Drugs and hopefully will cause a 
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